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In what respects, if any, should the 




uman beings are undoubtedly blessed with the most 
extraordinary gift of nature—the most sophisticated 
consciousness. However, it is also this superb awareness 
which shackles some Homo sapiens with an abject 
humiliation - an irrational horror of their animality. The human 
animals’ realisation of their biological, hence finite, condition can 
impel them to fearfully disclaim their ancestry and strive to 
'transcend' their natural condition. The human species' claim to 
superior physical and moral status in the natural world on the basis 
of either their 'unique' rationality, dignity or worth, is specious. 
Traditional western philosophical, religious, scientific and literary 
ideologies have initiated and sustained a myth that the other 
animals, including the Great Apes other than Homo sapiens, are 
inferior members of the natural world. These ideologies have 
contributed to our primate cousins’ exclusion from the opportunity 
to relish a life suffused with physical, intellectual and emotional 
dignity. 
 
In this article I intend to briefly appraise some of the areas within 
western traditional ideologies which have perpetuated the attitude 
that all animals, other than human, are not entitled to be treated with 
even the minimal degree of respect accorded to some human beings. 
I also intend to evaluate contemporary sources which indicate that in 
view of recent field studies and scientific research on the non-human 
primates, existing objections to the extension of equality (implying 
moral obligations) to the other primates1 can no longer be sustained. 
Recorded attempts of the search by western scholars for an 
explanation of the origins of the species, particularly the existence 
                                                 
1 References in this article to 'the other primates', 'non-human primates', 'other 
Great Apes' refer to those primates other than human presently taxonomically 





and nature of the human species, reveal that theories have been 
swayed either by disarming ignorance or misplaced conceit.  From 
audacious beginnings as humble ‘prickly barks’2 (c.500BC), the 
human animal has become elevated in status to the extent that 
humans generally consider themselves to be the sublime result of the 
biological evolutionary process. The notion of the human animal's 
supremacy over inanimate and all other animate living forms gained 
credence, in part, because of the acceptance of the influential works 
of the Greek philosopher, Aristotle (384-322BC).3 
 
Following his categorisations differentiating plants, animals and 
humans, Aristotle concluded that what clearly differentiates humans 
from the other animals is that the human alone, of all animate things, 
has the capacity to reason. Whilst other animal beings and plants 
have the ability to perceive or respond to environmental factors, 
they do not have consciousness, that is, they lack self-awareness and 
the ability to reason abstractly. Rather than use reason, plants 
respond to stimuli, and animals 'obey their instincts'.4 
 
Furthermore, Aristotle's claim of the existence of a 'principle of rule 
and subordination in nature at large' also contributed to sanctioning 
the idea that animals exist without any intrinsic worth.5 
 
Plants exist to give subsistence to animals, and 
animals to give it to (men). Animals...serve to 
furnish man not only with food, but also with 
other comforts...Accordingly, as nature makes 
nothing purposeless or in vain, all animals must 
have been made by nature for the sake of men.6 
 
                                                 
2 Anaximander, quoted by Plutarch, in Early Greek Philosophy, J. Barnes, (Penguin, 
London, 1987), p. 73. 
3 Aristotle, 'Parts of Animals' in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. J. Barnes, Book 
1, Chapter 1, 645b, (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1991), p. 998. 
4 Aristotle, Politics, trans E. Barber, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1977), I.V., 9, 
p. 6. 
5 ibid., V, 1, p. 91. 
6 In this article, the generic 'men' or 'man' is retained solely for the purpose of 
quoting ad verbatim. See Aristotle, Politics, V111, p. 95. 
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As animals exist within nature without the capacity to reason (being 
guided instead by instincts) they are, therefore, provided by nature 
for the use of the human being. 
 
Apart from the influence of ancient Greek writers such as Aristotle, 
the writings of the ancient Hebrews and later of Christian 
theologians were also instrumental in the formation of a demeaning 
attitude towards the other animals within western culture. In the 
ancient Hebrew text The First Book of Moses, called Genesis7, two 
aspects in particular warrant attention. The account of the origin of 
the human within the world: 'So God created man in his own  image, 
in the image of God created he him; male and female created he 
them.'8 reflects an existing cultural belief in the pre-eminence of the 
human species, especially the male of the species. Furthermore, 
instructions to humans to 'have dominion over the fish of the sea, 
and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth 
upon the earth'9 authorises humans to adopt authority over all the 
animals. 
 
Later Christian doctrines also reflect the disparate relationship 
between humans and the animals. In his work Summa Theologica, St. 
Thomas Aquinas (c.1225-1274) advises 'There is no sin in using a 
thing for the purpose for which it is. Now the order of things is such 
that the imperfect are for the perfect...things, like plants which 
merely have life, are all alike for animals, and all animals are for 
man.'10 In addition, Aquinas' ruling 'it matters not how man behaves 
to animals, because God has subjected all things to man's power'11 
would have undoubtedly contributed to reinforcing cultural beliefs 
of the mental and moral supremacy of the human and exacerbated 
existing exploitative practices against the animals. As a result of 
these doctrines, the other Great Apes, in particular, have been 
especially maligned within western cultural discourse and 
symbolism. 
 
                                                 
7 Genesis, The Holy Bible, (King James version, 1611), pp. 5-64. 
8 ibid., 1:27, p. 6. 
9 ibid., 1:28, p. 6. 
10 Aquinas, from ‘Summa Theologica’, quoted in Animal Liberation, P. Singer, 
(Jonathan Cape, London, 1976), p. 211. 
11 ibid., p. 213. 
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Of all the animals, the non-human primate has been most 'deeply 
involved in western ideas on human nature, morals and origins'12 
and consequently occupies a prominent, yet paradoxical, position 
within western cultural symbolism. In traditional eastern cultures 
monkeys and apes were accorded respect as they were considered to 
be mediators between the human and a deity, or alternatively were 
personified and revered as a deity.13 In comparison, apart from a 
period in the eighteenth century when apes were pictured as gentle, 
'human-like creatures', western culture has tended to stereotype the 
primates as savage, brutal beings; beings personifying licentious or 
evil behaviours—behaviours deemed as uncivilised or immoral 
within human societies. Furthermore, the primates were generally 
the objects of derision, being perceived as either intriguing 
zoological exhibits or as creatures deserving extermination.14 
 
The non-human primates have long endured being the 'object' of 
human fascination. Fascination itself, if applied with consideration 
and courtesy towards the being who is viewed, is not necessarily a 
problem.  However, the present ambiguous biological15 and moral 
standing of the other primates within western communities is not a 
reflection of our society's 'fascination with the primates', but rather 
an attitude which reflects the fact that our fascination has mostly 
been perverse. Unlike the other animals, however, the non-human 
primates do occupy a unique position in the psyche of humans and 
in the natural world. To the consternation of some humans, the non-
human primates alone of all  animals other than human, most 
resemble in form and behaviour the human animal. 'They are neither 
completely human, nor completely animal, but both at once'. None 
but the other primates 'inhabit the margins of humanity'16, a 
                                                 
12 R. Corbey, ‘Ambiguous Apes’, in The Great Ape Project, eds., P. Cavalieri & P. 
Singer, (Fourth Estate, London, 1993), p. 129. 
13 ibid., pp. 129-130. 
14 ibid., p. 131. 
15 I am of the opinion that the present taxonomical categorisation of the 
chimpanzee primate and the human primate does not honestly reflect the human's 
kin relationship to them. In evolutionary terms, the chimpanzee and the human 
share a 'recent' common ancestor, are genetically dissimilar by less than 1% and yet 
are classified within separate families, namely Pongidae and Hominidae 
respectively. 
16 Corbey, ‘Ambiguous Apes’, p. 130. 
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collective of privileged primates reluctant to accept, let alone 
approve, a change in status for our cousins from 'object' to subject. 
 
The realisation within recent times of the Great Ape's capacity to be 
self-aware, to reason and to feel has gradually altered, to a degree, 
cultural perception of them and given rise to the dilemma regarding 
their disenfranchisement from the moral domain. The rigid 
distinction traditionally assumed to exist between the human and 
other animals has proved difficult to maintain, especially in light of 
indisputable evidence of the primate origins of humankind.17 In 
addition, a more sophisticated understanding gained through the 
scientific disciplines including genetics and molecular biology has 
led to a reappraisal of the existing taxonomic systems, particularly 
with regard to the human/animal distinction. Furthermore, recent 
field studies and scientific research have contributed to scientific and 
ethical challenges to existing theories and beliefs in relation to our 
kinship with, and our unethical treatment of, the other Great Apes.  
 
Results from studies conducted to assess the cognitive abilities of the 
primates have issued a challenge to the most cherished 'hallmark' of 
the human—the ability to reason. The ability to reason arises from 
the faculty of consciousness, the origin of the experiences referred to 
as thought, self-awareness, emotions, intentionality etc. The human's 
claim to be entitled to occupy a privileged and dominant position 
within the natural world, including the animal kingdom, is based 
upon the belief that the human animal alone has the 'unique' ability 
to reason. This claim, however, is contested by researchers Roger 
Fouts and Deborah Fouts18 following their studies with chimpanzee 
primates. The researchers claim that demonstrations of an array of a 
complex set of abilities, and spontaneous communication amongst 
themselves and with human researchers, verifies the undeniable 
existence, within the chimpanzee primates, of non-human thought. 
 
                                                 
17 Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species, (Faber & Faber, London, (1889), 1979). 
Whilst Darwin did not emphatically state that the human being was indeed an ape 
(p. 217) his explication of the origins of vegetative and animal species (being both a 
biological and an evolutionary process) resulted in altered cultural perceptions 
and eventual scientific acceptance of the primate origins of humankind. 
18 R.S. Fouts and D.H. Fouts, 'Chimpanzees' Use of Sign Language', in Cavalieri & 
Singer, The Great Ape Project, pp. 28-41. 
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In one particular investigation19 of the cognitive abilities of 
chimpanzees, Fouts and Fouts conducted a remote videotaped study 
of chimpanzees using American sign language in over five thousand 
instances. According to Fouts and Fouts, demonstrations of certain 
behaviours previously considered unique to the human and 
associated with the human's reasoning process were demonstrated 
to be present within the chimpanzees.  For example, like humans, 
chimpanzees are able to use what is referred to as 'referential 
communication', that is, the chimpanzees have the ability to think 
about, and comment on things and events in their environment. In 
addition, the employment of 'informative signing' indicates that the 
chimpanzees are able to ask for things not in their immediate 
environment.20 The ability to refer to things and events not in an 
immediate environment was previously thought to be an ability that 
only humans are capable of possessing. Also, the use by the 
chimpanzee subjects of 'expressive signing' to spontaneously express 
an emotion when upset or excited by something21 is an indication 
that chimpanzees, as well as humans, subjectively experience 
emotions. Furthermore, according to Fouts and Fouts, chimpanzees 
not only displayed evidence of imagination and memory but are 
able, following the acquisition of human sign language, to pass the 
language on to following generations.22 
 
It is apparent from results of this particular study by Fouts and Fouts 
that chimpanzee beings are able not only to communicate within 
their own kind, but possess the capacity to reason to the extent that 
they have the ability to 'adopt' a human language to reciprocate the 
human's attempt to communicate with them. The study further 
indicates that chimpanzee beings are capable of acting with a sense 
of purpose, that is, intentionally, and that they too experience 
emotions. The study therefore negates the human being's claim to 
what was previously considered an ability unique to the human—
reason. It also provides an opportunity to challenge another human 
presumption: on the basis that humans are biologically unique 
because of their capacity to reason and are therefore intrinsically 
                                                 
19 ibid., pp. 33-39. 
20 Fouts and Fouts, ‘Chimpanzees’ Use of Sign Language’, p. 35. 
21 ibid., pp. 35-36. 
22 ibid., pp. 36-39. 
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valuable, the human alone of all creatures is the sole creature eligible 
and entitled to claim the right to a life infused with physical, 
intellectual and emotional dignity. 
 
If acceptance into the community of equals is on the proviso that one 
be a conscious being, that is a being able to reason, having the 
capacity to feel emotions, feel pain and suffering, and be self-aware, 
then the evidence from the above study alone indicates that calls to 
include the other Great Apes within the human moral domain are 
not based upon theoretical delusion or misplaced sentimentality, but 
upon empirically verifiable facts. 
 
According to the 'Universal Declaration of Human Rights’23 the 
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world depends upon 
recognition of not only the inherent dignity of the human being but 
the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human 
family.24 The fundamental rights accorded to humans: 'Everyone has 
the right to life, liberty and security of person. No one shall be 
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment' 
(Articles 3 and 5)25, were intended as a common standard by which 
nations could promote respect for the intrinsic value of all members 
of their communities and the human species universally. These 
particular rights are vital to human beings, particularly if they are 
living within societies reluctant to recognise the intrinsic worth of an 
individual. Without them their hopes of living a life with some sense 
of security and general well-being are diminished. 
 
Needless to say, if the human scientific establishment eventually 
managed to recognise the human being’s kinship with the other 
Great Apes, the human moral community also needs to do some 
research. The universal human moral community is in a position to 
use its moral agency to recognise that a number of 'our family' are 
being denied the opportunity to exercise their  inalienable rights to 
life, liberty and freedom from torture. 
 
                                                 
23 The General Assembly, United Nations, 'Universal Declaration of Human Rights' 
(1948), in Human Rights, C. Freeman, (B.T. Batsford Ltd., London, 1990), pp. 66-68. 
24 ibid., p. 66. 
25 ibid., p. 11. 
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In 'A Declaration on the Great Apes'26, a group of persons concerned 
with the current status and plight of the other Great Apes is 
lobbying for the  'extension of the community of equals to include all 
great apes: human beings, chimpanzees, gorillas and orangutans'.27 
The 'community of equals' is defined as the moral community within 
which its members accept certain basic moral principles or rights as 
governing their relations with each other and which are enforceable 
at law.28 Amongst these principles or rights are included: 
 
• The Right to Life  
 The lives of members of the community of 
equals are to be protected. Members of the 
community of equals may not be killed 
except in very strictly defined circumstances, 
for example, self-defence. 
  
• The Protection of Individual Liberty 
 Members of the community of equals are not 
to be arbitrarily deprived of their liberty. 
  
• The Prohibition of Torture 
 The deliberate infliction of severe pain on a 
member of the community of equals, either 
 wantonly or for an alleged benefit to others, 
is  regarded as torture, and is wrong.29 
 
As mentioned previously, of all the Great Apes, only the human ape 
is protected by legislation against denial of the above three basic 
rights. The human ape also has recourse to anti-discrimination laws, 
unlike our cousins, who are dependent upon others to combat the 
crime of 'speciesism'. 
 
                                                 
26 ibid., p. 11. 
27 ibid., p. 4. 




Speciesism, as defined by Singer, is 'a prejudice or attitude of bias in 
favour of the interests of members of one's own species and against 
those of members of other species'.30 Given that there are differences 
between humans and non-human primates, and that the capacity to 
reason within the other primates is not as 'sophisticated' as the 
humans' ability to reason, it needs to be recognised that there are 
also members of the human community with varying degrees of 
mental capacity.31 
 
Human individuals such as infants, comatose and brain-damaged 
persons and those afflicted with mental illness are protected by 
statutory rights from being excluded from the human moral 
community regardless of their mental capacities and/or ability to 
exercise their autonomy. 'If possessing a higher degree of 
intelligence does not entitle one human to use another for his(sic) 
own ends, how can it entitle humans to exploit nonhumans for the 
same purpose?'.32 It stands to reason that on the basis that the other 
Great Apes possess consciousness, self-awareness, and have the 
capacity to reason and experience emotions, they are just as entitled 
to be included within the community of equals as are the able and 
less abled members of our species. 
 
It is beyond dispute that the primates, including the human, share a 
specific morphological feature - the central nervous system - a 
product of which is the physical experience of pain. Considering that 
it has been scientifically proven that the other primates also have 
self-awareness, one could safely infer that they, along with the 
human primate, share not only the feeling of pain but also the 
experience of misery arising as a result of it. Apart from 
physiological evidence, common sense should enable the human 
species to acknowledge that suffering as a result of experiencing 
pain is an experience common to both us and the other primates. 
This knowledge does not generally appear, however, to impel 
                                                 
30 P. Singer, Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals, (Jonathan 
Cape, London, 1976), p. 7. 
31 Heta Hayry and Matti Hayry, 'Who's Like Us?', in Cavalieri & Singer, The Great 
Ape Project, p. 176. 
32 Singer, Animal Liberation, p. 7. 
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human beings to exercise their moral agency in a manner humane to 
our kin. 
 
A human being in possession of his/her faculty of consciousness is 
aware that there is a limit to the endurance of pain. Upon reaching a 
point at which endurance is insufferable, at least the human can 
physically and verbally articulate his/her anguish. Recognition of the 
commonality of the experience of misery resulting from suffering 
pain does not appear to be a primary concern in the attitude of some 
humans conducting experiments upon other sentient animals, 
including the other primates. As Singer has succinctly noted ‘[w]hile 
we overlook our savagery, we exaggerate that of other animals’.33 
 
The human species, let alone a human community of equals, is 
somewhat of a misnomer. In spite of nations uniting and declaring a 
charter of universal human rights, historically, some western 
individuals and their societies have not always managed to behave 
in an egalitarian manner. The subjugation of women and 
enslavement or genocide of indigenous peoples, for instance, are 
prime examples of some peoples' attitudes to certain members of the 
species. Human resistance to change is understandable to the degree 
that those occupying positions of power and dominance are 
reluctant to alter the 'status quo' and forgo their privileges. Some 
humans’ propensity to assume a recalcitrant attitude is, I believe, 
rather accurately reflected in the following quote: 
 
Man usually either considers himself a self-
made animal and consequently adores his 
maker, or assumes himself to be the creation of 
a supreme intelligence, for which the latter is 
alternately congratulated and blamed. An 
attitude of humility, abasement, contrition, and 
apology for its shortcomings is thoroughly 
uncharacteristic of the species Homo sapiens, 
except as a manifestation of religion. I am 
convinced that this most salutary of religious 
attitudes should be carried over into science. 
                                                 
33 Singer, Animal Liberation, p. 248. 
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Man should confess his evolutionary 
deficiencies, and resolve that, in future, he will 
try to be a better animal.34 
 
Given that our understanding of biological beings has advanced, 
especially since the advent of molecular biology, and given the 
scientific evidence of the existence of reason and self-awareness in 
the non-human primates, contemporary society is now in a position 
to seriously consider evidence repudiating former views which were 
detrimental to the well being of the primates. As Hooton states, the 
human animal could indeed be a better animal. Rather than 
presuming that Homo sapiens is positioned at the pinnacle of the 
evolutionary process, the human species could extend consideration 
to all the other animals. The other animals could be viewed as 
successful adaptors of their specific species, animals who too can 
reason and feel. At the very least, the other Great Apes could be 
extended the courtesy of being treated as the subjects they are and 
receive their due entitlements of 'the right to life, the protection of 
individual liberty and freedom from torture'.35 
 
As the present situation stands, intervention in the non-human 
primates' lives in human controlled situations is not without 
attendant complications. It is obvious upon reading the concerned, 
even passionate, accounts36 of their encounters with the other Great 
Apes, that some researchers, observers and carers hold these special 
Beings in the highest esteem. However, by imparting specifically 
human cultural behaviours and concepts to the other primates there 
is, I believe, the possibility of some members of the human species 
attempting to impose our culture upon them. 
  
Our level of awareness, apart from bringing us our most exquisite 
joys, also brings us our greatest angst and, at times, awesome 
sorrow. 
 
                                                 
34 E.A. Hooton, from ‘Apes, Men and Morons’ (1937), quoted in The Evolution of 
Evil, T. Anders, (Open Court, Illinois, 1994),p. 73. 
35 The Editors and Contributors, ‘A Declaration on Great Apes’, Cavalieri & Singer, 
The Great Ape Project, p.4. 
36 ibid., pp. 1-312. 
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What does it mean to be a self-conscious animal? 
The idea is ludicrous, if it is not  monstrous. It 
means to know that one is food for worms. This 
is the terror: to have emerged from nothing, to 
have a name, consciousness of self, deep inner 
feelings, an excruciating inner yearning for life 
and self-expression—and with all this yet to 
die.37 
 
Imposition of the 'condition' known as human upon the other Great 
Apes would be highly questionable, if not inhumane. Far better they, 
our cousins - 
   
  relish their freedom under their canopies and skies 
                                    we be relieved of reading their suffering with 
                                                        mad, bleeding eyes.             E.M. 
 
Bernard Rollin's inspirational appeal for the extension of the right to 
life, liberty and freedom from torture to the non-human primates:  
  
We should let them be...(with) their 
inexhaustible wonders and grandeur, And let 
the dictum be proclaimed—know without 
hunting, see without manipulating, cherish in 
itself, not for myself38 
 
captures a notion of equality already implicit in feminist ethics.  It is 
one, I believe, which could foster not only acceptance of, but a 
universal respect for, all living beings regardless of sex, gender, race 
or species. 
 
One would hope with the approaching millennium and the 
corresponding two thousandth anniversary of the western ethical 
system - which claims mercy to be one of its principal tenets - the 
human species would unfetter, from the criminal arena of 
speciesism, our primate cousins. 
                                                 
37 E. Becker, quoted in T. Anders, The Evolution of Evil, p. 179. 
38 B.E. Rollin, 'The  Ascent of Apes - Broadening the Moral Community', in 




For my cousins - 
      (especially 'the Girls') 
    My cousins are wailing,  waiting 
              The earth is listening,  weeping 
    I am hearing,  hurting 
    Learning,  believing 
    Planning. 
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